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Introduction  
 
A decade ago, the Supreme Court of Canada significantly changed the law on 
substantive review of administrative decision-making in Canada.1 The standards of 
reasonableness simpliciter and patent unreasonableness were collapsed into one 
standard of reasonableness.  Three standards of review became two: reasonableness 
and correctness. The goal of Dunsmuir in reducing the standards from three to two 
was to simplify the standard of review analysis and reduce the time and resources 
spent on judicial review.  There is broad consensus that this objective has not been 
achieved.  As noted by Paul Daly, “Dunsmuir is cited roughly one hundred times a 
month, twenty-five times a week, five times a (working) day.”2 From Southam’s3 three 
to Dunsmuir’s two, reducing the standards of review has done nothing to remedy the 
problems litigants experience with administrative law generally, and judicial review 
in particular.   
 
The only remaining judge on the Supreme Court of Canada who partook in 
Dunsmuir is Justice Abella, and she has urged for revision.  In Wilson v Atomic Energy 
of Canada Ltd,4 Justice Abella explained that Dunsmuir  “sought to provide ‘a 
principled framework that is more coherent and workable’”5 but “collapsing three into 
two has not proven to be the runway to simplicity the Court had hoped it would be.”6   
 
Chief Justice McLachlin (as she then was) made the following remarks on 
her time on the bench and the development of administrative law: 
 
I lived through the Southam era of three standards of review — correctness, 
reasonableness, and patent unreasonability, and saw it narrowed to two 
standards in Dunsmuir. In recent years, I have seen this solidify into a 
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1 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir].  
2 Paul Daly, “Struggling towards Coherence in Canadian Administrative Law: Recent Cases on Standard of 
Review and Reasonableness” (2016) 62:2 McGill LJ 527 at 529 [Daly, “Struggling towards Coherence”]. 
3 Hunter v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 SCR 145, 11 DLR (4th) 641 [Southam]. 
4 Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, 2016 SCC 29, [2016] 1 SCR 770 [Wilson].  
5 Ibid at para 25, citing Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 32.  
6 Ibid at para 25. 
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presumption of deference toward the decisions of tribunals interpreting their 
home statutes. The next focus may be exploration of reasonableness itself.7  
 
She advocated for “a generous and flexible approach” to the reasonableness 
standard, with the “presumption of reasonableness reflect[ing] the deference that is 
due to the person or body which the legislature has appointed as decision-maker.”8  
The correctness standard ought to be utilized for “rare questions of statutory 
interpretation where there can and must be only one answer”.9  Many commentators 
agree, suggesting the path to reform must lead to one standard of review: 
reasonableness.10  
 
Ultimately, it was hoped that changes to the standard of review would 
improve administrative law’s ability to deliver access to justice. However, the 
problems with standard of review are only one indicator of judicial review’s 
infirmities.  Judicial review, as it is currently formulated, is a barrier to access to 
justice.  It is not an effective remedy for administrative law litigants. This paper 
provides a case study to illustrate how resources are tied up in procedural wrangling 
rather than giving litigants the means to have their disputes determined on the merits.  
Enormous amount of resources are still spent debating the standard of review.  The 
practice of remitting the matter to the first instance decision-maker following a 
successful judicial review unnecessarily increases the resources required to conclude 
the matter.  The parties are taken from point A and returned to point A, having invested 
significant time, energy, and money.   
 
Ten years after Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court of Canada has declared its 
intent to revisit this seminal decision. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal 
in three cases, and, remarkably, they have told us why: “The Court is of the view that 
these appeals provided an opportunity to consider the nature and scope of judicial 
review of administrative action, as addressed in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick … and 
subsequent cases.”11 The Court has specifically invited the parties to devote a 
substantial part of their submissions to the question of standard of review.  
 
This paper explains why judicial review, as an important component of 
administrative law, is broken, and why modification of the standard of review is not 
the solution.  Specifically, the authors describe the inherent problems with having only 
one standard of reasonableness.  First, Dunsmuir’s expansion of the reasonableness 
standard has done nothing to simplify judicial review.  Dunsmuir has not achieved the 
desired clarity in interpreting reasonableness; many courts simply do not engage in a 
                                                 
7 Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, PC, Chief Justice of Canada, “‘Administrative Law is Not for 
Sissies’: Finding a Path Through the Thicket” (2016) 29:2 Can J Admin L & Prac 127 at 134.  
8 Ibid at 133. 
9 Ibid at 133.  
10 Jonathan Coady advocates for a single standard of review for reasonableness in his article. See Jonathan 
Coady, “The Time Has Come: Standard of Review in Canadian Administrative Law” (2017) 68 UNBLJ 87.  
11Applications for Leave, Bell Canada, et al v Attorney General of Canada, case number 37896, 10 May 
2018 [Leave Decision], online: <https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-l-csc-a/en/item/17083/index.do> 
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standard of review analysis. Second, one standard of reasonableness ignores 
legislative intent, which should be the cornerstone of judicial review. Third, one 
standard of reasonableness does not further the rule of law.  The rule of law should, at 
its core, make the law predictable.  Reasonableness, by its very nature, does nothing 
to promote predictability because implicit in the notion of reasonableness is that there 
can be more than one reasonable outcome. Fourthly, reform to judicial review must 
respect the constitutional role of judges. One standard of review ignores both the 
presence (or absence) of a privative clause, and the legitimate constitutional reason as 
to why the courts established the correctness standard in the first place – namely, that 
judges have a critical constitutional role in deciding issues of law. Finally, the most 
recent decisions of the Supreme Court illustrate that in their efforts to come closer to 
one standard of reasonableness, what they are practically doing is undertaking a 
correctness analysis vaguely disguised as reasonableness.    
 
Ultimately, this paper agrees with Justice Abella and Chief Justice 
McLachlin (as she then was) that judicial review needs reform. However, given the 
judiciary’s constitutionally-protected role in determining questions of law, the 
confusion in applying reasonableness, and the current epidemic of access to justice in 
judicial review generally, one standard of reasonableness is not a workable fix.  The 
authors instead offer an innovative alternative by examining the already established 
process for overturning decisions: appeals. This paper suggests a return to standards 
that have been proven workable and understandable: “palpable and overriding error” 
for questions of fact and “error” for issues of law.  These standards maintain the 
principles underlying Dunsmuir and put an end to the turmoil facing tribunals, 
courtrooms and classrooms.  Appeals using these standards promote the rule of law, 
respect legislative intent, and protect the constitutional role of judges by granting 
deference to issues of fact but not to issues of law.  
 
In Dunsmuir, Justice Binnie (as he then was) articulated that “[e]very hour of 
a lawyer’s preparation and court time devoted to unproductive ‘lawyer’s talk’ poses a 
significant cost to the applicant.”12 The standard of review for Mr. David Dunsmuir 
himself was the least important issue.13 Access to justice means access to a hearing on 
the merits.  Eliminating the standard of review promotes access to justice by reducing 
arguments over process and, consequently, hearing the merits of a dispute more 
quickly.  
 
 
Judicial Review in Its Current Form is a Barrier to Access to Justice: A Case 
Study 
 
The problems with administrative law are not limited to the standard of review.  The 
complexity surrounding the standard of review is only one symptom of administrative 
                                                 
12 Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 133.  
13 Clarence Bennett, “David Dunsmuir – An Unlikely Administrative Law Celebrity,” Paul Daly, 
Administrative Law Matters, online: 
<http://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2018/02/23/david-dunsmuir-an-unlikely-administrative-
law-celebrity-clarence-bennett/> 
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law’s affliction. Judicial review as a remedy has failed to achieve its intended objective 
– to offer faster and simpler avenues of redress to persons whose interests are affected. 
 
The following case study demonstrates some inefficiencies of the current 
administrative system. The practical reality of many administrative law hearings is 
that they are more time and resource-intensive than any ordinary court trial. Justice 
Cromwell identified access to justice as the most important issue facing the legal 
system and called the system “too complex, too slow, and too expensive.  It is too 
often incapable of producing just outcomes that are proportional to the problems 
brought to it or reflective of the people it is meant to serve.”14  
 
 NARL Refining Limited Partnership (“NARL”) operates a refinery in 
Newfoundland and Labrador.  In December 2015, two employees exercised their 
statutory right to refuse work they believed to be unsafe.  Specifically, they refused to 
be present for a scheduled shift during which no specific task had yet been assigned 
to them.  One employee refused to work on the basis that he was not adequately 
trained.  The other employee refused to work on the basis that his co-worker was not 
adequately trained.  
 
 This led to an investigation by the Occupational Health and Safety Division 
(“OHS”). About six months later, OHS issued four directives. The first directive 
involved training pursuant to a process management code of practice. NARL had a 
fundamental disagreement with the applicability of the process management code.  
The directives themselves indicated to NARL that they could appeal to the Assistant 
Deputy Minister (“ADM”).  NARL filed an appeal to the ADM.  In September 2016, 
the ADM dismissed the appeal and indicated that NARL could appeal further to the 
Labour Relations Board (the “Board”).  In October 2016, NARL filed an appeal to the 
Board.  
 
 The Board has no rules of procedure which govern appeals of OHS 
directives.  There was thus a procedural debate before the Board about what the proper 
process should be.  The Board had previously considered an appeal concerning an 
occupational health and safety issue, and that matter had proceeded on the basis of a 
trial de novo.  As a result, NARL expected a trial de novo.  However, despite its earlier 
decision, the Board decided it was proper to proceed with a review of the matter on 
the record before the ADM.  OHS attended the hearing but made no submissions.  At 
the conclusion of the hearing in May 2017, the Board simply declared that it did not 
have jurisdiction over the dispute.  As of May 2018, the Board has still not released 
its reasons for that decision. 
 
 NARL accepted the finding that the Board lacked jurisdiction and, in 
November 2017, NARL applied to the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador 
for judicial review of the ADM’s decision. In January 2018, the parties appeared 
before the Supreme Court to set a date for a hearing on NARL’s application.  At the 
                                                 
14 Honourable Justice Thomas Cromwell, “Access to Civil and Family Justice: A Roadmap for Change”, 
Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters (October 2013) at 1, online: 
<http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2013/AC_Report_English_Final.pdf>. 
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application hearing, OHS indicated that it would likely be filing an application for 
judicial review of the Board’s finding that the Board did not have jurisdiction, despite 
the fact that OHS did not take any position on jurisdiction at the hearing before the 
Board. Further, OHS was of the view that its anticipated application should be 
scheduled in advance of NARL’s because if the application was successful, it would 
be requesting that the matter be remitted to the Board.  Last, OHS advised that it may 
ask the Board to reconsider its decision declining jurisdiction before even applying for 
judicial review, adding yet another layer of process over merits. 
 
 Arguably, if the matter were remitted or reconsidered by the Board, the Board 
could decide that it, in fact, does have jurisdiction.  Further complicating the issue is 
that many of the members appointed to the Board have changed in the intervening 
time, including the Board Chair.  If the Board decides that it does have jurisdiction, 
and proceeds to deal with the matter on a review basis, then the Board could, in theory, 
decide to remit the matter to the ADM which would have the effect of restarting the 
entire process.       
 
 The procedural wrangling is not unique to this case. The incident occurred in 
December 2015, and as of May 2018, no decision-maker has heard the actual merits 
of the case.  This is not access to justice.  
 
 
There are Inherent Problems with Reasonableness that remain unsolved since 
Dunsmuir 
 
I.  Reasonableness has not simplified judicial review  
 
Chief Justice McLachlin (as she then was) explained that it is the role of judicial 
review to ensure that “the decisions of Ministers, agencies are within their powers and 
reasonable.”15 Judicial review, she remarked, preserves the rule of law.16  
Administrative law was supposed to be a quicker and easier way for parties to resolve 
their issues where specialized tribunals composed of experts would adjudicate the 
matter before them. The courts, on the other hand, were to serve an important oversight 
role to ensure that administrative decision-makers, created by statute, stay within the 
confines of their statutory authority.  
 
Honourable Justice David Stratas calls administrative law “the body of law 
that tells us when the judiciary can legitimately interfere with decision making by the 
executive”.17  “Resting at its heart”, he proclaims, “is the standard of review.”18  The 
                                                 
15 McLachlin CJ, supra note 7 at 133.  
16 McLachlin CJ, supra note 7.   
17 Honourable Justice David Stratas, “The Canadian Law of Judicial Review: A Plea for Doctrinal 
Coherence and Consistency” (2016) 42 Queen’s LJ 27 at 30.  
18 Ibid. 
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role of judicial review is “fundamental to democratic order and good governance,” 
and as such, it requires “objectivity, consistency and predictability”.19  
 
If standard of review is the heart of administrative law, then a trip to the 
cardiologist is in order. Modern administrative law is not achieving objectivity, 
consistency, or predictability. Administrative boards and tribunals have failed to 
deliver a faster dispute resolution process. In the words of the then Chief Justice 
McLachlin, “[t]he central issue in judicial review is determining when it is appropriate 
to overrule the decision of an administrative decision-maker.”20  Yet the courts spend 
more time battling over the appropriate standard of review instead of addressing the 
heart of the matter.  Litigants who simply want their issues determined on the merits 
are left unsatisfied.  
 
Robert Danay undertook an empirical analysis to determine whether there 
has been any measurable difference in how deferential the Supreme Court of Canada 
has been since Dunsmuir.21 He examined every case in which the Supreme Court 
reviewed an administrative decision on substantive grounds, beginning with 
Pushpanathan v Canada22 and ending with Commission scolaire de Laval v Syndicat 
de l’enseignement de la région de Laval.23  He then compared pre-Dunsmuir and post-
Dunsmuir cases.  Danay argued “that the most objective way to test the hypothesis 
that the Dunsmuir framework leads to less deference being shown to administrative 
decision makers is to examine the rates at which judges have identified a deferential 
standard of review and overturned the decision before and after Dunsmuir.”24  
 
Danay’s findings show that while the Court as a whole overturned 
administrative decisions at a significantly lower rate under the Dunsmuir framework 
than under the pragmatic and functional approach, members of the Court either upheld 
or overturned a decision “without identifying a standard of review approximately one 
third of the time both before and after Dunsmuir.”25  In approximately one-third of all 
of the Court’s decisions over two decades, the Supreme Court has not even mentioned 
the standard of review in its decision.  Danay explains that the Court showed very little 
deference when it did not identify a standard of review,26 effectively applying the 
correctness standard.  
 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 McLachlin CJ, supra note 7 at 133.  
21 Robert Danay, “Quantifying Dunsmuir: An empirical analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
jurisprudence on standard of review” (2016) 66:4 U Toronto LJ 555.  
22 Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1998] 1 SCR 982, 160 DLR (4th) 
193 [Pushpanathan].  
23 Commission scolaire de Laval v Syndicat de l’enseignement de la région de Laval, 2016 SCC 8, [2016] 
1 SCR 29 [Commission scolaire de Laval].  
24 Danay, supra note 21 at 567.  
25 Danay, supra note 21 at 576. 
26 Danay, supra note 21 at 580. 
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Judicial review as a concept was not created by the legislature. Instead, it was 
a creature of the courts designed to address legislative actions which were not 
compliant with the Constitution. At the apex of our judicial system is the Supreme 
Court of Canada. It is responsible for guarding the Constitution and supervising the 
laws of Canada.  In relation to administrative agencies, the Supreme Court of Canada 
“alone supervises the functioning of intermediate appellate and reviewing courts to 
ensure that they conduct appeals as intended and that they do not trench upon the 
proper role of trial courts and administrative agencies.”27 
 
When the highest court of the land does not identify a standard of review, it 
chooses not to provide any justification for upholding or rejecting decisions made by 
administrative bodies.28  By remaining silent on the standard of review, both before 
and after Dunsmuir, the Court acts against its own jurisprudence. That the Court 
continued to ignore the standard of review post-Dunsmuir is surprising, considering 
the Court’s clearly articulated stance in Dunsmuir.  
 
Ginn and Lahey et al conducted a series of studies to understand the 
implications of Dunsmuir.29  They ultimately concluded that Dunsmuir has simplified 
the law without reintroducing interventionist tendencies back into the law. Their 
studies are important because they demonstrate that the outcome a court arrives at does 
not depend on its standard of review analysis, but instead on the courts’ absorption of 
the Dunsmuir demand for deference. While the four factors that were used in the 
former pragmatic and functional approach are still relevant to the standard of review 
analysis,30 the studies showed that the nature of the question at issue was a core aspect 
of determining the standard of review.31  They cite Justice Deschamps in Dunsmuir, 
who explains that “‘[a]ny review starts with the identification of the questions at issue 
as questions of law, questions of fact or questions of mixed fact and law. Very little 
                                                 
27 Donald JM Brown, QC, Civil Appeals (Toronto: Carswell, 2009) (loose-leaf supplement 2017), 1:0222 
[Civil Appeals].  
28 In his empirical study, Danay identified cases where no standard of review was specified. One such case 
is Mount Sinai Hospital Center v Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services), 2001 SCC 41, [2001] 2 
SCR 281.  
29 Ginn & Lahey, et al ‘‘How Has Dunsmuir Worked? A Legal-Empirical Analysis of Substantive Review 
of Administrative Decisions after Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick: Findings from the Federal Courts” (2017) 
30 Can J Admin L & Prac 51 [Ginn & Lahey, Part 1]; “How Has Dunsmuir Worked? A Legal Empirical 
Analysis of Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions after Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick: Findings 
from the British Columbia Courts” (2017) 30 Can J Admin L & Prac 173 [Ginn & Lahey, Part 2]; “How 
Has Dunsmuir Worked? A Legal Empirical Analysis of Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions 
after Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick: Findings from the Courts of Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario and Alberta” 
(2017) 30 Can J Admin L & Prac 317 [Ginn & Lahey, Part 3]. Please note that Part 2 of the series is not 
relied on because British Columbia has legislated standards of review for judicial review for many 
administrators through its Administrative Tribunals Act. Parts 1 and 3 of the series are referenced in this 
paper.  
30 Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 64. The four factors are (1) the presence or absence of a privative clause; 
(2) the purpose of the tribunal as determined by interpretation of enabling legislation; (3) the nature of the 
question at issue and; (4) the expertise of the tribunal.  
31 Lahey et al, supra note 29 at 336.  
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else needs to be done in order to determine whether deference needs to be shown to 
an administrative body.’”32   
 
Ginn and Lahey et al expected to find the Dunsmuir description for 
reasonableness referenced in every decision where the court undertook a 
reasonableness review.33  As defined in Dunsmuir, a reasonable decision has two parts: 
it must be transparent, justifiable, and intelligible, and the result must fall within a 
reasonable range of outcomes, taking account of the law and the facts.34  They found 
that the Dunsmuir formulation of what reasonableness looks like was explicitly used 
to accept or reject the administrative decision-maker’s reasons and outcomes for less 
than 60% of decisions under review.35  They also found significant variation in the 
conduct of the standard of review analysis – the brevity of the analysis and the factors 
analyzed. As demonstrated in the cases below, an outcome-based approach does not 
simplify administrative law, but continues to muddy it. The concern post-Dunsmuir 
was that courts would undergo a correctness review, disguised as a reasonableness 
review. It is no less concerning, however, that a court may take a deferential approach 
when it should be applying a correctness review.  
 
Others have noted the inconsistent post-Dunsmuir jurisprudence.  
Honourable Justice Joseph T. Robertson, formerly of the Federal Court of Appeal and 
the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, delivered a speech in which he acknowledges 
that the “post-Dunsmuir jurisprudence is incompatible with [his] understanding of 
what was decided in Dunsmuir.”36  Paul Daly has also criticized the Court’s recent 
jurisprudence: 
 
While academics, practitioners and lower-court judges try to establish 
coherent frameworks to understand the general principles of judicial 
review, the Court has been resolving cases one by one without, with respect, 
any serious attempt to explain how they fit into its existing body of 
administrative law jurisprudence.37 
 
He argues that there has been such confusion in administrative law that it is 
now necessary to distinguish between the signal and the noise – between cases that 
actually “modify administrative law doctrine and those cases that simply deal with a 
particular substantive area of law.”38  With this paper, Daly adds another voice to the 
mounting confusion and frustration directed at the current state of administrative law.  
 
                                                 
32 Ibid at 336, citing Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 158.  
33 Lahey et al, supra note 29.  
34 Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 47. 
35 Ginn & Lahey, Part 3, supra note 29 at 204.  
36 Honourable Joseph T Robertson, QC, “Identifying the Review Standard: Administrative Deference in a 
Nutshell” (2017) 68 UNBLJ 145 at 154. 
37 Paul Daly, “The Signal and the Noise in Administrative Law” (2017) 68 UNBLJ 68 at 68.  
38 Ibid.  
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II.  The Role of Legislative Intent 
 
Dunsmuir has resulted in neither simplification nor increased deference to decision-
makers. The studies would suggest that courts are effectively (if not expressly) 
ignoring the standard of review. They were doing it before Dunsmuir, and they 
continue to do it after Dunsmuir. In doing so, the Supreme Court acts against its own 
jurisprudence and drifts further away from an approach that reflects legislative intent.  
 
The concept of judicial review originated in the Court’s desire to manifest 
the legislature’s intention, which was to delegate certain decisions to statutory 
decision-makers while at the same time preserving the supervisory role of judges, as 
contemplated by the Constitution. The first factor to be considered in the standard of 
review analysis, as outlined in Pushpanathan, was the presence (or absence) of a 
privative clause.  The Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir rebuked non-deferential 
and intrusive behaviour of courts which interfered with legislative intent.  The Court 
specifically cautioned that respect for legislative intent must be maintained. 
 
In 2012, Daly lamented the apparent demise of the standard of review 
analysis. He proclaimed that the “barriers between a decision maker and a non-
deferential court erected by the standard of review analysis have been torn down by 
Dunsmuir and the Court’s subsequent decisions.”39 Daly longingly referred to the 
Canadian history of prioritizing legislative intent. The authors echo his concerns:  
 
the standard of review analysis largely respects the traditional view of courts 
as agents of the legislature, with a duty to give effect to legislative intent 
(while at the same time ensuring that the legislature had remained within its 
constitutional boundaries). […] But one of the great advances made by 
Canadian courts in developing the standard of review analysis was to take 
legislative enactments seriously. No longer was “legislative intent” treated 
as a purely formalistic incantation, an empty vessel into which courts could 
pour their desired judicial review doctrine. Rather it was treated as 
providing guidance to courts as to how best to shape the law of judicial 
review.40    
 
In cases post-Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to give little 
weight to legislative intent, and instead favours a more formalistic, categorical 
approach. For example, in Edmonton (City) v Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping 
Centres Ltd,41 the Supreme Court again disagrees on the applicable standard of review, 
and seems to disregard their own warnings. In this case, a taxpayer company filed a 
complaint with the local assessment review board. Accepting the city’s assertion that 
the taxes were too low, the Board decided to increase the assessment. The taxpayer 
company applied for leave to appeal to the Court on a question of law or jurisdiction, 
                                                 
39 Paul Daly “The Unfortunate Triumph of Form over Substance in Canadian Administrative Law” (2012) 
50:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 317 at 357.  
40 Ibid at 356.  
41 Edmonton (City) v Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd, 2016 SCC 47, [2016] 2 SCR 293 
[Edmonton East].  
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pursuant to the statute. The statute explicitly included a statutory appeal on questions 
of law and jurisdiction. The issue was whether a local assessment review board was 
permitted to increase an assessment after a taxpayer appeals its municipal tax 
assessment or whether it was limited to lowering or confirming the assessment. The 
Court of Queen’s Bench identified the issue as a question of jurisdiction and applied 
the correctness standard.42 That Court found that the board did not have the jurisdiction 
to increase the assessment and sent the matter back to the board for a new hearing.43  
The matter was then appealed to the Court of Appeal.   
 
 At the Court of Appeal, Justice Slatter declared, “[t]he day may come when 
it is possible to write a judgment like this without a lengthy discussion of the standard 
of review. Today is not that day.”44 After a contextual analysis, he applied the 
correctness standard and dismissed the City’s appeal. He disagreed with the lower 
court that the issue on appeal was a true question of jurisdiction. He determined that 
the nature of the statutory regime, the presence of a statutory right of appeal, the nature 
of the issue in question (a question of law that did not fall within the board’s expertise) 
and that the interpretation of the statute would be applicable throughout the province, 
were all factors that required a correctness review.  
 
 The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed. Justice Karakatsanis, writing for 
the majority with Justices Abella, Cromwell, Wagner, and Gascon concurring, 
quashed Justice Slatter’s decision, and his wishes, by responding, “[t]hat day has not 
come, but it may be approaching.”45 They found that the standard of review was 
presumed to be reasonableness because the issue involved interpreting the board’s 
home statute.46 They also held that the board had the authority to increase the 
assessment.  
 
 Echoing Dunsmuir, the majority explained that the two competing principles 
of legislative supremacy and rule of law “require the courts to respect the choice of 
Parliament or a legislature to assign responsibility for a given decision to an 
administrative body”,47 and that the courts have the “last word on whether an 
administrative body has acted within the scope of its lawful authority”.48  Justices Côté 
and Brown dissented, with Chief Justice McLachlin (as she then was) and Justice 
Moldaver concurring in dissent. They applied a correctness standard of review, 
explaining 
 
The legislature of Alberta created a municipal assessment complaints 
regime that allows certain questions squarely within the expertise of an 
                                                 
42 Ibid at para 16.  
43 Ibid at para 17.  
44 Edmonton (City) v Edmonton East (Capilano), 2015 ABCA 85 at para 11, [2015] 5 WWR 547.  
45 Edmonton East, supra note 41 at para 20.  
46 Ibid at para 23.   
47 Ibid at para 21. 
48 Ibid. 
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assessment review board to be reviewed on a deferential standard through 
the ordinary mechanism of judicial review. The legislature, however, also 
designated certain questions of law and jurisdiction — for which 
standardized answers are necessary across the province — to be the subject 
of an appeal to the Court of Queen’s Bench. Where the court quashes a 
decision, its answers to these questions are binding on the Board. This leads 
to the unavoidable conclusion that the legislature intended correctness 
review to be applied to these questions.49  
 
We agree with the dissent. The dissent explained that “[t]he ‘overall aim’ of 
the standard of review analysis has always been ‘to discern legislative intent, keeping 
in mind the constitutional role of the courts in maintaining the rule of law’”50 and cited 
Justice Binnie who noted that the standard of review analysis “‘is necessarily flexible’ 
as it seeks ‘the polar star of legislative intent’”.51  
 
Even if there was a presumption of deference for the Board’s interpretation, 
the dissenting judges noted that the presumption of deference was rebutted by “clear 
signals of legislative intent.”52  One clear signal was a statutory right of appeal.  The 
dissent explained, citing Justice Binnie, that this was “‘an important indicator of 
legislative intent’” and, depending on its wording, it ‘may be at ease with [judicial 
intervention]’”.53 The statutory right of appeal coupled with the legislative scheme 
were clear signals used by the legislature to rebut the presumption of deference.  Still, 
the majority did not heed these signals.  
 
The dissent continued that the “legislature must have known that judicial 
review is available for any question not covered by a limited right of appeal […], given 
that the legislature is presumed to know the law”54 and quoted Justice Bastarache of 
Pushpanathan: 
 
The key to the legislative intention as to the standard of review is the use of 
the words “a serious question of general importance” …. The general 
importance of the question, that is, its applicability to numerous future 
cases, warrants the review by a court of justice. Would that review serve 
any purpose if the Court of Appeal were obliged to defer to incorrect 
decisions of the Board? Is it possible that the legislator would have 
provided for an exceptional appeal to the Court of Appeal on questions of 
“general importance”, but then required that despite the “general 
importance” of the question, the court accept decisions of the Board which 
                                                 
49 Ibid at para 63 [emphasis added].  
50 Ibid at para 65, citing Dr. Q v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, 2003 SCC 19 at 
para 26, [2003] 1 SCR 226.  
51 Ibid at para 65, citing CUPE v Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29 at para 149, [2003] 1 SCR 
539, Binnie J [CUPE].  
52 Ibid at para 66.  
53 Ibid at para 73, citing Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 55, [2009] 1 
SCR 339, Binnie J.   
54 Ibid at para 78. 
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are wrong in law […]. The only way in which s. 83(1) can be given its 
explicitly articulated scope is if the Court of Appeal […] is permitted to 
substitute its own opinion for that of the Board in respect of questions of 
general importance.55  
 
  If the presence of a statutory right of appeal and the constellation of factors 
present in Edmonton East do not call for a standard of correctness, in what situations 
can the courts ever have the ultimate word on the law?  How does a legislature indicate 
that it intends the ordinary rules of an appeal to apply? 
 
The majority explained that, in their view, the presumption of deference on 
judicial review  
 
respects the principle of legislative supremacy and the choice made to 
delegate decision making to a tribunal, rather than the courts. A presumption 
of deference on judicial review also fosters access to justice to the extent 
the legislative choice to delegate a matter to a flexible and expert tribunal 
provides parties with a speedier and less expensive form of decision 
making.56  
 
It is difficult to understand how the Court’s application of the reasonableness standard 
in Edmonton East achieves any of these objectives. In reversing two decisions below 
it (the Court of Appeal being unanimous), the Supreme Court muddles the state of 
administrative law, and the importance of legislative intent is lost in the fog.  
 
 
III.  The Rule of Law  
 
In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court thoroughly explained the concept of judicial review 
as one “intimately connected with the preservation of the rule of law.”57 The 
preservation of the rule of law is the “constitutional foundation which explains the 
purpose of judicial review and guides its function and operation.”58  Judicial review’s 
purpose is to “address an underlying tension between the rule of law and the 
foundational democratic principle, which finds an expression in the initiatives of 
Parliament and legislatures to create various administrative bodies and endow them 
with broad powers.”59  To respect legislative intent, courts must be “sensitive not only 
to the need to uphold the rule of law, but also to the necessity of avoiding undue 
interference with the discharge of administrative functions in respect of the matters 
delegated to administrative bodies by Parliament and legislatures.”60 
                                                 
55 Ibid at para 78, citing Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] 1 SCR 
982 at para 43, 160 DLR (4th) 193 [underlined emphasis original; italicized emphasis added].  
56 Ibid at para 22.  
57 Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 27.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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Inherent in “reasonableness” is the notion that there can be a range of 
reasonable outcomes. This, by its very nature, means no predictability among 
decision-makers hearing a similar issue. Dunsmuir defined reasonableness as follows:   
 
In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of 
justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making 
process.  But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a 
range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of 
the facts and law. 61  
 
This means that on the same facts, one adjudicator can decide an outcome that is 
opposite to that of another adjudicator, but both can still fall within this “range of 
possible acceptable outcomes”.62 “Reasonableness” by its very nature implicitly lacks 
predictability, objectivity, and finality and is therefore a threat to the rule of law.  
 
 The problem of adjudicators reaching opposing decisions on the same issue 
does not just arise in theory.  The issue of the correct application of severance for part-
time nurses is a real-world example.63 A part-time nurse claimed that she had been 
denied severance pay in contravention of the collective agreement.  To receive 
severance pay benefits, an employee had to work for nine or more years of continuous 
service. Both the union and the employer agreed that the nurse was employed for nine 
years. The dispute was whether or not the part-time nurse achieved the eligibility 
requirement of continuous service. Though the circumstances were the same and the 
provisions in dispute were identical, two different arbitrators arrived at opposite 
conclusions.  In one decision, the majority of the arbitration board sided with the union 
and upheld the grievance.64  In the second decision, most of the majority’s decision 
focused on the interpretation of defined terms in the collective agreement, and 
dismissed the grievance, siding with the employer.65  These decisions have not 
undergone judicial review. It is likely that both decisions would meet the 
reasonableness test, leaving the employer and union with no guidance.  There is no 
consistency, predictability, or finality.  This simply encourages the parties to go to 
arbitration each time this issue arises and “arbitrator shop” for the one who decided 
the issue in their favour.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 47.  
62 Ibid. 
63 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v St. Clare’s Hospital (Alcock) June 26, 1983 (unreported) 
[Alcock] & Newfoundland Association of Public Employees v Newfoundland Hospital Association-Channel 
Hospital (Thistle) April 1, 1980 (unreported) [Thistle].  
64 Alcock, supra note 63. 
65 Thistle, supra note 63.  
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IV.  One Unified Standard of Reasonableness Ignores the Constitutional 
Role of Judges in Deciding Issues of Law 
 
Justice Stratas’ characterization of the Court’s goal being legitimate interference 
exemplifies what Chief Justice McLachlin called the “tension-ridden borderland”66 
between the executive branch and the judicial branch.  It is the “combination of two 
fundamental values — the rule of law on the one hand and effective governance on 
the other — [that] condemn[s] administrative decision makers and the courts to a 
difficult relationship from which neither can escape.”67  
 
A survey of post-Dunsmuir decisions shows that the Supreme Court of 
Canada has overwhelmingly used the reasonableness standard when the decisions do 
not involve a legislated standard of review or a constitutional question.68  Justice 
Abella endorses the ascendancy of the reasonableness standard, proposing the 
elimination of the correctness standard.  In Wilson, Justice Abella makes the 
noteworthy comment:  
 
Nothing Dunsmuir says about the rule of law suggests that constitutional 
compliance dictates how many standards of review are required. The only 
requirement, in fact, is that there be judicial review in order to ensure, in 
particular, that decision-makers do not exercise authority they do not have.69  
 
Administrative bodies were primarily created for access to justice. Specialized 
expertise was also cited as a reason, although, practically, the actual expertise of the 
administrative decision-makers varies immensely between provinces and types of 
administrative decision-makers.  Specialized experience should not automatically be 
presumed.     
 
Parliament rightly recognized that courts could not hear every proceeding in 
the land.  To ensure that people’s matters were being heard, and fairly, Parliament and 
legislatures began creating these specialized tribunals.  In Crevier v Quebec (Attorney 
General),70 the Supreme Court for the first time “declared unequivocally that a 
provincially-constituted statutory tribunal cannot constitutionally be immunized from 
review of decisions”.71 If the correctness standard was completely eliminated, the 
Court’s theme of balancing the rule of law and legislative supremacy no longer makes 
sense.  It is simply not constitutional to eliminate correctness as a standard of review.   
 
                                                 
66 McLachlin CJ, supra note 7 at 128.  
67 McLachlin CJ, supra note 7 at 129.  
68 Lauren J Wihak, “Wither the correctness standard of review? Dunsmuir, Six Years Later” (2014) 27:2 
Can J Admin L & Prac 173 at 182. 
69 Wilson, supra note 4 at paras 31–33 [emphasis in original].  
70 Crevier v Quebec (Attorney General), [1981] 2 SCR 220, 127 DLR (3d) 1 [Crevier]. 
71 Ibid at 236.  
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The recent Supreme Court decision in Delta Air Lines Inc v Lukács72 
illustrates the confusion with respect to applying standard of review analysis to issues 
which were traditionally considered questions of law.  The decision was split 6-3, with 
all parties agreeing that the standard was reasonableness at both levels of court.  In 
this case, Dr. Lukács filed a complaint with the Canadian Transportation Agency 
alleging that Delta Air Lines applied discriminatory practices in relation to the 
transportation of obese passengers.  The complaint was filed on August 24, 2014.  On 
November 25, 2014, the Agency dismissed the complaint on the basis that Dr. Lukács 
failed to meet the tests for private interest and public interest standing as developed 
by and for the courts of civil jurisdiction.  It found that Dr. Lukács lacked private 
interest standing because he himself was not obese and so he could not claim to be 
aggrieved or have some other sufficient interest.  It also determined that he lacked 
public interest standing because his complaint did not challenge the constitutionality 
of legislation or the illegal exercise of an administrative authority. Under its 
legislation, the Agency has discretion to determine whether it will hear a complaint. 
 
Dr. Lukács appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal.  The Court of Appeal 
found that a strict application of the law of standing as applied in the courts was 
inconsistent with the Agency’s enabling legislation, and that it was contrary to the 
Agency’s objective to refuse to examine a complaint based only on whether the 
complainant had been directly affected or had public interest standing.  The Court of 
Appeal found that “the Agency unreasonably fettered its discretion”73 and directed 
that the matter be returned to the Agency to “determine, otherwise than on the basis 
of standing, whether it will inquire into, hear and decide the appellant’s complaint.”74 
  
The issue at the Supreme Court of Canada was whether or not the Agency’s 
decision was reasonable. Chief Justice McLachlin (as she then was), writing for the 
majority, found that the Agency did not reasonably exercise its discretion to dismiss 
Dr. Lukács’ complaint, and remitted the matter to the Agency to reconsider whether it 
would hear the complaint. The Court found that the decision did not satisfy the 
requirements of justification, transparency, and intelligibility, as required by the 
Dunsmuir definition of reasonableness, for two reasons. 
 
  As the Court noted, “[f]irst, the Agency presumed that public interest 
standing [was] available and applied a test that could never be met.”75  The Court later 
explained that “[a]ny valid complaint against an air carrier would impugn the terms 
and conditions established by a private company”, and that “[a] complaint regarding 
[those] terms and conditions can never, by its very nature, be a challenge to the 
constitutionality of legislation or the illegality of administrative action.”76  From this 
reasoning, the Court found that the “imposition of a test that can never be met could 
                                                 
72 Delta Air Lines v Lukács, 2018 SCC 2, 416 DLR (4th) 579 [Delta Air Lines].  
73 Delta Air Lines Inc v Lukács, 2016 FCA 220 at para 30, 408 DLR (4th) 760.  
74 Ibid at para 32.  
75 Delta Air Lines, supra note 72 at para 13.  
76 Ibid at para 17.  
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not be what Parliament intended when it conferred a broad discretion on this 
administrative body to decide whether to hear complaints.”77  The Court also found 
that, “[s]econd, the total denial of the public interest standing [was] inconsistent with 
a reasonable interpretation of the Agency’s legislative scheme.”78  The Court found 
that the way the Agency applied the tests “would preclude any public interest group 
[…] from ever having standing before the Agency”.79  The Court found that this was 
“contrary to the scheme” of the Agency’s enabling legislation under which 
“Parliament […] grant[ed] the Agency broad remedial authority.”80 In its decision, the 
Court explained why “this was not a case where merely supplementing reasons [could] 
render the [Agency’s] decision reasonable”,81 writing that “[i]t would be ironic to 
allow the appeal in the name of deference and then stipulate how the Agency should 
determine when to hear a complaint”.82 
 
 The dissent, delivered by Justice Abella, explained that nothing in the 
Agency’s governing statute prevented it from applying the same standing rules used 
by the courts.  The dissent also found that the Agency’s decision was not unreasonable.  
The dissent identified Parliament’s intention to give the Agency “the authority to 
interpret and apply its wide-ranging governing statute dealing with national 
transportation issues, address policy, and balance the multiple competing interests 
before it”.83 They found that there was “nothing in the Agency’s mandate that 
circumscribes its ability to determine how it will decide what cases to hear.”84 
 
In this case, there was no discussion about whether the Court should apply a 
correctness or reasonableness standard.  Yet, the issue before the Court involved 
questions of law, specifically whether the enabling legislation gave the Agency 
discretion to apply the public interest and private interest standing test.  There were 
no factual disputes in the case.  The majority essentially undertook a correctness 
analysis of a question of law, vaguely disguised as a deferential reasonableness 
analysis.  
 
 
V.  Reasonableness Disguised as Correctness 
 
Pretending that one is giving deference to an administrative decision maker by using 
the word “reasonableness” may currently be in fashion, but it is not helping 
practitioners understand what reasonableness means, nor is it helping the rule of law 
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid at para 13.  
79 Ibid at para 19.  
80 Ibid at para 20.  
81 Ibid at para 25.  
82 Ibid at para 28.  
83 Ibid at para 44.  
84 Ibid. 
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or access to justice.  It appears somewhat intellectually dishonest for a court to decide 
that the standard is reasonableness but that in any given case there is only one 
reasonable outcome – this is actually correctness.  As administrative law expert David 
Jones asserts in his commentary on Wilson, “[t]he Court sometimes used the 
reasonableness standard of review to find something unreasonable when it really 
meant it was incorrect.”85   
 
The most recent decision from the Supreme Court addressing standard of 
review is Groia v Law Society of Upper Canada.86 The Supreme Court in Groia 
followed Delta Air Lines in purporting to apply a reasonableness standard but arguably 
undertaking a correctness analysis. What makes Groia unique is that the dissenting 
reasons specifically acknowledge this issue. 
 
Mr. Groia is a lawyer who was found by the Law Society Hearing Panel to 
have engaged in professional misconduct based on uncivil behaviour during a trial.87  
The Law Society Appeal Panel confirmed the finding of professional misconduct.88  
The Divisional Court found that the Appeal Panel’s decision was reasonable.89 The 
majority Court of Appeal also identified reasonableness as the appropriate standard of 
review and found the decision reasonable.90 The dissent indicated that matters which 
took place in court were reviewable on the standard of correctness.91 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada decision involved three sets of reasons. The 
majority (Chief Justice McLachlin and Justices Abella, Moldaver, Wagner and 
Brown) found that the standard of review was reasonableness.92 Further, they 
determined that the approach and test adopted by the Appeal Panel was appropriate.93 
Yet, they found that somehow the Appeal Panel’s application of the facts to the stated 
test was unreasonable, and allowed the appeal, substituting their view that Groia did 
not engage in professional misconduct primarily because Groia had a sincerely held 
but mistaken belief on the law regarding abuse of process.94 
 
                                                 
85 David Phillip Jones, “From Coast to Coast: The Year in Review in Administrative Law” (Paper delivered 
at the CBA Administrative Law, Labour and Employment Law Conference, 17-18 November 2017), online: 
<http://sagecounsel.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/2017-Recent-Developments-Admin-Law-
DPJones.pdf>.  
86 Groia v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 27, 2018 CarswellOnt 8701 [Groia]. 
87 Law Society of Upper Canada v Joseph Peter Paul Groia, 2012 ONLSHP 94 (CanLII).  
88 Law Society of Upper Canada v Joseph Peter Paul Groia, 2013 ONLSAP 0041 (CanLII).  
89 Groia v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONSC 686 at para 142, 124 OR (3d) 1.  
90 Groia v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2016 ONCA 471 at para 241, 131 OR (3d) 1.  
91 Ibid at para 256.  
92 Groia, supra note 86 at para 57.  
93 Ibid at para 62.  
94 Ibid at paras 122–125. 
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Justice Côté, agreed in the result, also finding that the appeal should be 
allowed. However, she found that the standard was correctness as the conduct occurred 
in a courtroom. Therefore, her analysis did not involve any deference to the Appeal 
Panel.95 
 
The dissenting jurists (Justices Karakatasanis, Gascon, and Rowe) agreed 
with the majority that the applicable standard is reasonableness.96 However, they 
found the decision was reasonable.97 They outlined that the majority substituted its 
own judgment for that of the legislature’s chosen decision maker which is not in 
accordance with a proper interpretation of reasonableness or deference. As explained 
in the dissent: 
 
We also have a number of concerns about Justice Moldaver’s application of 
the reasonableness standard. Respectfully, we are of the view that he 
fundamentally misstates the Appeal Panel’s approach to professional 
misconduct, and reweighs the evidence to reach a different result. This is 
inconsistent with reasonableness review as it substitutes this Court’s 
judgment for that of the legislature’s chosen decision maker 
…  
Finally, we note that all of the adjudicators and judges who reviewed this 
decision on the standard of reasonableness also concluded that the Appeal 
Panel’s ultimate finding of misconduct was reasonable.  The only person to 
conclude that Mr. Groia’s conduct did not amount to misconduct was the 
dissenting judge at the Ontario Court of Appeal, who applied a correctness 
standard of review.  This Court should resist the temptation to substitute its 
view on what the Appeal Panel should have done.98   
 
With respect to the Supreme Court of Canada, it is difficult to understand how the 
majority analysis of the Appeal Panel’s decision constituted reasonable deference. 
What the majority appeared to do is provide deference to the Appeal Panel’s findings 
of fact, but then underwent what was essentially a correctness analysis in how those 
facts applied to the legal test as stated. Of course, this is the approach that an appellate 
court would normally take on an appeal. However, as articulated by the dissent, it’s 
not reasonableness as that term had been traditionally used and applied in 
administrative law.  
 
 
The Appeal of Appeals  
 
The 2018 decisions in Delta Air Lines and Groia follow the earlier decisions in 
Edmonton East and Wilson in a string of jurisprudence from the Supreme Court that 
adds to the confusion concerning standard of review and confusion concerning the 
meaning of “reasonableness”. The presumed application of the reasonableness 
                                                 
95 Ibid at para 162.  
96 Ibid at para 175.  
97 Ibid at para 218.  
98 Groia, supra note 86 at paras 177, 218. 
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standard to a decision-maker’s home statute is questionable. Judges are presumed to 
be experts in law, and, as such, a correctness standard presumption applied to cases 
involving home statutes is more logical. Even more confusing was the Court’s 
adoption of reasonableness for the tests of standing, which were common law 
concepts. A court’s ability to decide issues of law is fundamental to the rule of law 
and democracy. Issues of law clearly include, and go beyond, strict questions of 
statutory interpretation. Under our Constitution, it seems unlikely that one standard of 
review of reasonableness is (or, at least, should be) permissible. 
 
This paper suggests that administrative law legislation should either specify 
an appeal in accordance with the normal appellate standards or specify a trial de novo.  
Appellate courts perform three functions: “[f]irst, they supervise the workings of trials 
and other adjudicative decision-makers to ensure due process. Second, they correct 
substantive errors by the initial adjudicator. And third, [they] carry primary 
responsibility for the development of the common law and other jurisprudence within 
their jurisdictions.”99 
 
In Ledcor Construction Ltd v Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co,100 the 
Supreme Court of Canada explained: 
 
The law of standard of review — including the distinction between 
questions of law and those of mixed fact and law — seeks to achieve an 
appropriate division of labour between trial and appellate courts in 
accordance with their respective roles. The main function of trial courts is 
to resolve the particular disputes before them […]. Appellate courts, 
however, “operate at a higher level of generality” […].They ensure that “the 
same legal rules are applied in similar situations”, as the rule of law demands 
[…]. Appellate courts also have a law-making function, which requires 
them to “delineate and refine legal rules”.  
 
These particular functions of appellate courts — ensuring consistency in the 
law and reforming the law — justify reviewing pure questions of law on the 
standard of correctness. By contrast, appellate courts defer to findings of 
fact in part because they can discharge their mandate without second-
guessing trial courts’ factual determinations […]. For questions of mixed 
fact and law, the correctness standard applies to extricable errors of law 
(such as the application of an incorrect principle) because, again, a review 
on the standard of correctness is necessary to allow appellate courts to fulfill 
their role. However, where it is “difficult to extricate the legal questions 
from the factual”, appellate courts defer on questions of mixed fact and law. 
101 
 
Using appeals to monitor decisions of tribunals maintains the principles 
articulated in Dunsmuir.  Participants do not need to be introduced to a new system.  
Lawyers are familiar with appellate courts, and litigants will be able to have their cases 
                                                 
99 Civil Appeals, supra note 27 at 1:0210. 
100 Ledcor Construction Ltd v Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co, 2016 SCC 37, [2016] 2 SCR 23.  
101 Ibid at paras 35–36 [citations omitted].  
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heard on the merits. Unlike Dunsmuir, which has been cited thousands of times, the 
leading case on standards of appellate review, Housen v Nikolaisen,102 has been cited 
significantly less, though it was decided six years before Dunsmuir.103 Housen 
clarified the applicable standards of review for appellate courts in a way that Dunsmuir 
did not.  
 
Furthermore, the use of appeals supports Justice Stratas’ plea for doctrinal 
coherence and consistency. One correct outcome is more helpful to the rule of law 
than the range of outcomes that a unified reasonableness standard would offer. The 
continuing and increased use of the reasonableness standard implies that there are 
multiple reasonable outcomes.  This results in diminished predictability of the 
outcome in any given matter and, ultimately, increases use of mechanisms like 
arbitration given the possibility of opposite outcomes on the same facts. 
 
Appeals also provide more satisfying outcomes than those that arise from 
judicial review. When an appellate court determines that a lower court has made an 
error, it ordinarily substitutes its own decision. A party receiving a decision has 
typically had its rights adjudicated. Parties are spared the time and expense of a 
rehearing before the administrative decision-maker.  
 
The remedies available to a successful applicant of judicial review are largely 
unsatisfactory.  In a judicial review, the court’s powers are limited; they can only 
quash a decision. This is because a court does not have statutory authority to exercise 
the discretion conferred on the tribunal, except to correct unintended mistakes made 
by the tribunal. This means that the court will simply refer the matter back to a tribunal.  
They will not supervise the tribunal’s reconsideration. The same tribunal members are 
able to conduct the rehearing if the matter is remitted.  Under this current system, the 
person whose interests are at stake is taken from point A all the way back to point A 
again, often after having invested significant resources. It is very difficult to explain 
to judicial review litigants that getting the matter returned for a rehearing is “success”.    
 
Specifically with respect to resources, there seems to be a misconception that 
a reasonableness standard of judicial review is somehow more efficient and saves 
judicial and court resources.  The authors have yet to review any evidence which 
supports such a notion. On the contrary, engaging in constant standard of review 
analyses frequently doubles the number of issues to be decided (and therefore the time) 
of any judicial review hearing.  Further, the idea of remitting the issue to the original 
decision-maker (essentially providing a “do-over”) is resource-intensive. Giving a 
court the ability to issue a final determination on a matter is the best and most efficient 
use of resources, as demonstrated by the above noted case study. Lastly, the rule of 
law is the most important principle in a free and democratic society. The Supreme 
Court of Canada in R v Jordan104 quite rightly placed an accused’s (and victim’s) right 
to a timely trial ahead of scarce court resources. Similar considerations apply here – 
                                                 
102 Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 SCR 235 [Housen]. 
103 Daly, “Struggling towards Coherence”, supra note 2 at 529.  
104 R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 SCR 631. 
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the rule of law must be given the highest priority and litigants deserve timely hearings 
that decide issues on the merits.  
  
Legislatures can direct that matters are either subject to appeals (with 
ordinary appeal standards) or to a trial de novo. This will not overburden the court 
system.  As an example, one of the newer forms of administrative statutory decision-
makers are privacy commissioners. Privacy legislation across Canada typically 
provides for a trial de novo, meaning that there is no deference provided to the 
commissioner, even on issues of fact. As of yet, privacy matters have not 
overburdened the court system, and the matters that have been before the courts have 
been dealt with expeditiously.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Judicial review started with changes to legislation which gave statutory decision-
makers the “final” say in certain matters. This can be fixed by clearly stating in the 
legislation that the decision of the statutory decision-maker is appealable using the 
standard of palpable and overriding error for questions of fact and correctness for 
questions of law.  If judicial review is not reformed, the current state of administrative 
law will continue to deny access to justice and put the administration of justice into 
disrepute.  It will create more uncertain jurisprudence or, as termed by Daly, noise. It 
will stifle the rule of law, and erode the constitutional role of judges.  
 
Appellate standards, on the other hand, provide a known avenue that can cure 
the infirmities of the current standards of review. Housen has proven successful and 
ought to be followed and used in administrative law. Justice Binnie explained that the 
standard of review had to be “necessarily flexible [to] see[k] the polar star of 
legislative intent”.105 An increasing access to justice crisis in Canada demands that we 
reconfigure judicial review into a system that does not create procedural uncertainty, 
which provides finality by not remitting the matter to the original decision-maker, that 
promotes the rule of law, and that protects the constitutional role of judges. Appeals 
do just that. 
                                                 
105 Edmonton East, supra note 41 at para 65, citing CUPE, supra note 51 at para 149 per Binnie J.   
